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INFLATION AND OIL BASED DEVELOPMENT: 
FAILURE OF THE MONETARIST MODEL 
IN SAUDI ARABIA 
ROBERT E. LOONEY{*) 
Abstract 
In order to determine a major cause of inflation in Saudi Arabia a 
monetarist model is develope_d and found to explain little of the observed 
pattern of price change. The inadequacy of the monetarist model in 
explaining the rate of inflation in Saudi Arabia raises the question as to 
whether or not the money supply is an exogenous variable in the country. 
If the money supply increases in response to other forces such as industria-
lization, some inftation will be the inevitable result of the structural factors 
underlying changes. . 
Introduction 
One of the most dramatic developments following the OPEC price 
increases of 1973-74 has been the balance of payment's position of most 
countries. In particular, the balance of payments accounts of Saudi Arabia 
have shown abnormally large surpluses on current account, balanced pri-
marily by a massive accumulation of foreign exchange. 
This development has a number of important implications for the 
conduct of the government's economic policy, for the balance of payments 
in an open economy plays an important role in determining changes in 
the stock of domestic money. International reserve inflows, for example, 
will increase the domestic stock of money if they are added directly to 
(*) Associate Professor of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California. 
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the money balances of residents, or if they are exchanged for domestic 
currency at the central bank. 
It is quite possible that reserve flows are an important factor, and 
perhaps at times the dominant one, in determining changes in the kingdom's 
domestic stock of money. This observation raises questions as to the major 
determinants of Saudi Arabian reserve flows and what role if any can 
government policy play in affecting these movements. To arrive at some 
tentative conclusions as to the nature of this adjustment mechanism in the 
Saudi Arabian context, estimates are made of the determinants of the 
kingdom's long run reserve position. This analysis is undertaken in the light 
of recent developments in the monetary theory of the balance of payments. 
A related adjustment of importance in forecasting the economy is 
the manner in which the inbalance between aggregate supply and demand 
has been reconciled through price changes. Since 1972, the rate of inflation 
experienced in Saudi Arabia has been much higher than during the 
preceding two decades. Saudi authorities have continually stressed that 
the current inflation is largely a result of the (unavoidable) transmission 
of world inflation into the domestic price system. On the other hand, 
SAMA has indicated that part of the blame for domestic inflation must 
lie with the highly expansionary expenditure programs introduced by the 
government following the 197 3 oil price increases and the resulting 
increase in the gap between aggregate demand and supply. 
The nature of the inflationary process in Saudi Arabia must be 
identified and quantified before a number of fundamental long run 
decisions such as the rate of oil production, the level of government 
domestic spending, and the value of the riyal/ dollar exchange rate can be 
intelligently made. In attempting to identify the type and sources of 
inflation experienced particularly after 1972 in the kingdom, three main 
questions need to be addressed: (1) to what extent has recent inflation 
been imported rather than domestically generated; (2) precisely what role 
have government expenditures played in creating and sustaining infla-
tionary pressures, and (3) has the country's underlying monetary mechanism 
been fundamentally different than that experienced in most other developing 
countries, and if so in what way and with what implications for stabili-
zation policy. 
Saudi Arabian Balance of Payments Accounts 
The fact that the Saudi Arabian government receives virtually all the 
oil revenue and at the same time determines the volume of imports and 
how the remaining surplus will be invested abroad, makes it difficult to 
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arrive at an estimate of the country's balance of payments position. More 
precisely, the distinction between the capital account and foreign exchange 
reserve items (on which the official definition of payments disequilibrium 
is based) usually is based on the assumption that the individuals or groups 
who make investment decisions (which are recorded in the capital account) 
are different from those who undertake residual or accomod~ting transac-
tions (which appear as foreign exchange reserve flows). Because of the 
government's unique role, this assumption is obviously not valid for the 
kingdom. Thus it is not at all clear what the best measure of the country's 
balance of payments surplus would be. 
For example, between 1974 and 1976 the country ran an accumulated 
current account surplus of just over $54 billion. Only about $23 billion 
in foreign exchange reserves were, however, accumulated during the same 
period (1). Since the government made almost all of the other $31 billion 
in foreign investments, the distinction between foreign exchange reserves 
and the remainder of Saudi Arabia's foreign assets is at best arbitrary. 
It is, therefore, somewhat misleading to suggest that Saudi Arabia had 
a payments surplus of only $23 billion during this period. 
Given the institutional environment in Saudi Arabia, it might be 
more reasonable to use the current account as the measure of payments 
disequilibrium. By this measure we get a surplus of $54 billion for 
Saudi Arabia during the 1974-76 period. Clearly, this measure conflicts 
with the notion that foreign exchange reserves are supposed to be highly 
liquid, since it is not reasonable to view Saudi investments in long and 
medium term assets as constituting reserves. . 
On the other hand, the «basic» balance of payments format (3), 
where the balance of payments is measured as the sum of the current 
and long term capital accounts, avoids this problem by placing such non-
liquid investments above the line as autonomous items. Short term invest-
ments are placed below the line with official foreign exchange reserves. 
Since the vast majority of Saudi investments were in short term assets 
during this period, the difference between the current account and the 
«basic» balance of payments results would have been quite small. As 
more and more of the kingdom's long term revenues flow into investments, 
the difference between the two accounts would become considerably larger. 
(1) Balance of payments figures arc from INTER.NATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Balance of 
Payments Year book, various issues. 
(2) These definitions arc from R. STERN, The Balance of Payments: Theory and 
Economic Policy (Chicago: Aldine, 1973), Ch. 2. 
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More fundamentally, however, the use of the «basic» format still 
leaves the question of whether Saudi medium and long term investments 
are really autonomous. Does the kingdom really have a preference of 
investing abroad or are officials doing so only because huge current account 
surpluses make it necessary to put the resulting surplus funds somewhere 
other than in the domestic economy. The latter interpretation argues that 
these investments are in fact really accommodating and consequently that 
the current account is the best measure of Saudi Arabia's payments position 
seen from this perspective. The $54 billion figure appears to be a far 
better estimate of the Saudi payments surplus during the 197 4-7 6 period 
than the $23 billion figure suggested by the official settlements accounts (3). 
The fact remains, however, that whatever final measure is chosen, 
the definition of Saudi Arabia's balance of payments surplus will, unlike 
the case in most countries, be essentially based on a set of arbitrary 
definitions. There can be no presumption that at any particular point in 
time it will necessarily reflect with any degree of accuracy the usual auto-
nomous and accommodating forces implied in the balance of payments 
statements. 
A Framework for Analysis 
One way of avoiding making arbitrary definitions of the country's 
balance of payments is to use the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments. The main characteristic of this approach is to group and classify 
all the items in the balance of payments into: (1) the money account, 
and (2) the trade plus capital account. Based on the principle of double 
entry accounting, these two accounts are equal. By combining trade and 
capital items, this approach thus avoids any artificial distinction as to what 
items should be considered autonomous or accommodating. 
In general the approach emphasizes the budget constraint imposed 
on the country's international spending and views the various accounts 
of the balance of payments as the « windows » (4) to the outside world 
(3) Cf. Robert DUNN, «Exchange Rates, Payments Adjustment, and OPEC: Why Oil 
Deficits Persist», Princeton University, International Finance Section, Essays in International 
Finance No. 137 (December 1979), pp. 7-8, for an excellent discussion of this point. 
( 4) Jacob FRENKEL and Harry JOHNSON, «The Monetary Approach to the Balance of 
Payments: Essential Concepts and Historical Origins», in Jacob Frenkel and Harry 
Johnson, The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1976), p. 22. 
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through which the excess 0£ domestic flow demands over domestic flow 
supplies and the excess domestic flow supplies over domestic flow demands 
are cleared. 
Accordingly, surpluses in the trade account and the capital account, 
respectively, represent excess flow supplies of goods and securities, and a 
surplus in the money account reflects an excess domestic flow demand 
for money. Consequently, in analyzing the money account (or the more 
familiar rate of increase or decrease in the country's international reserves), 
the monetary approach focuses on the determinants of the excess domestic 
flow demand for, or supply of money. 
Clearly, a consistent use of the budget constraint implies thi.t the 
money account - the current rate of change of reserves - can be analyzed 
in terms of the determinants of all the other accounts - at the simplest level 
of aggregation, the goods account and the capital account. The monetary 
approach, however, stresses an analysis in terms of the behavioral 
relationship directly relevant to the money account rather than an analysis 
in terms of the determinants directly related to the other accounts (and 
only indirectly to the money account via the budget constraint) (5). 
The monetary approach should, in principle, provide a picture no 
different from that obtained upon summing of an analysis of the individual 
capital and trade accounts. 
In order to facilitate applying the approach to the Saudi Arabian 
balance of payments data, it is assumed that: 
1. Transactions recorded in the kingdom's balance of payments are 
essentially a reflection of monetary phenomena. Emphasis is, therefore, 
placed on the direct influence of excess demands for or supplies of money 
on the country's balance of payments. 
2. The demand for and supply of money are stable functions of a 
limited number of variables. Changes in the money supply are, of course, 
not the only factors which affect the balance of payments. It is nevertheless 
assumed that real variables affect the balance of payments indirectly by 
first affecting the demand for or supply of money. 
3. It follows that the analysis of the impact of a policy or other 
change must begin with an analysis of how this change generates a diver-
gence between actual and desired money balances or affects such a 
divergence that already exists. 
(&) Ibid. 
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4. As noted the approach does not rely on an analysis of the 
individual balance of payments subaccounts; it is sufficient to aggregate 
individual components (goods, services, transfers, short and long term 
capital) into a simple single category-« items above the line». This 
procedure is pragmatic in that it recognizes that an excess supply of or 
demand for money may be cleared through the markets for either goods, 
services, or securities. If the balance of payments is viewed within this 
framework, the pitfalls also noted above of placing emphasis on any of the 
kingdom's particular subaccount are avoided. 
5. An accurate analysis of the kingdom's balance of payments can 
only be made in the long run. The approach recognizes that short run 
analysis is often complicated by the fact that the assumed adjustment 
mechanisms are incomplete during this frame. For example, the adjust-
ment of actual money .balances to their desired levels does not occur 
instantaneously, but rather requires the passage of time. 
6. The balance of payments adjustment process under the above 
assumptions is automatic. More specifically, any balance of payments 
disequilibrium or exchange rate movement reflects a disparity between 
actual and desired money balances and will automatically correct itself. 
Any balance of payments inbalance or exchange rate change is thus assumed 
to be a phase in the automatic adjustment process. It follows that attempts 
by the Saudi authorities to counter these processes would merely increase 
the forces which give rise to the adjustment ultimately required for a return 
to equilibrium. 
7. It follows that attempts by SAMA to neutralize the impact of 
international reserve flows on the domestic money supply are not poss~ble 
in the long run. The long run success in neutralizing the effects of 
international reserve flows implies that the Saudi authorities would be 
willing (since the country usually has a surplus) to trade investment and 
consumption goods for foreign currency balances. The accumulation of 
these balances by Saudi Arabia would represent a nonmarket induced 
transfer of wealth away from the kingdom to foreign consumers. There is 
no reason to assume the government would pursue such a policy in the 
long run. 
To summarize, the monetary approach used to examine Saudi Arabia's 
balance of payments stresses: 
1. The kingdom's balance of payments problems are monetary pro-
blems in a monetary world economic system. It follows that these pro-
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blems need to be analyzed by a model that explicitly specifies monetary 
behavior and integrates it with the real economy, rather than by a 
model that concentrates on real relationships and treats monetary behavior 
as a residual of real behavior. 
2. Money is a stock not a flow. Therefore, the model stresses that 
monetary equilibrium and disequilibrium require analysis of stock · equi-
librium conditions and stock adjustment processes. 
3. Although money can be obtained from two alternative sources: 
(a) the expansion of domestic credit and the exchange of goods or assets 
for international money, and (b) conversion of international into domestic 
money via the monetary authority with fixed exchange rates only the 
second would affect the kingdom's balance of payments. 
It should be emphasized again that the focus of the analysis is the 
overall balance of payments, and not only the balance of trade (many 
writers in different contexts have confused the two and write indifferently 
about the trade balance and the overall «official settlements» balance). 
The Model 
The basic propos1t10n that Saudi Arabia's balance of payments is 
determined by a mechanism which restores equilibrium between the supply 
of and demand for money can be illustrated ·by the following simple 
algebraic model (6). 
In equilibrium money supply is equal to money demand or: 
(a) MS= MD. 
Assuming the money multiplier to be fixed (and for convenience equal to 
one), equation (a) can be written as: 
(b) MD= MB 
where MB is equal to the monetary base; i.e., the sum of net foreign (R) 
and SAMA's domestic assets (D). Therefore: 
(c) MB= R + D. 
Assuming the· demand for money in Saudi Arabia to be a function of 
nominal income (Y n) and the interest rate (i), MD can be written as: 
< d) MD = I ( Y n , i) . 
(&) The notation follows that of Robert McNowN ,and Myles WALLACE, « International 
Reserve Flows of OPEC States: A Moneta.ry Approach»,· The Journal of Energy and 
Development (Spring 1977), pp. 267-278. · 
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Equating (c) and (d), transforming from levels to changes, and solving 
for the change in foreign reserve, AR, yields: 
(e) AR= -AD + /yAYn + f, Ai 
where AR is the balance of payments surplus (or deficit), /Y and /1 are 
the rate of change of money demand with respect to income and interest, 
respectively. 
An alternative formulation could be obtained by assuming the 
demand for money to be homogeneous of degree one in prices so that: 
(f ) MD = Pf ( Yr , i) . 
Here Yr is real income and P is the domestic price level. .Equating (f) 
to (c) and transforming to percentage rate of change yields: 
(g) R (R/MB) = -fJ(D/MB) + e11 y; + eii + P. 
Here e" and e, are the income and interest elasticities of the demand for 
money, a dot over each variable symbolizes a percentage rate of change 
and (R/MB) and (D/MB) are weights. 
Implicit in the model is that causality runs from money demand 
to money supply; i.e., attempts by SAMA to increase the money supply 
(MB) (by changing, for example, the level of domestic assets) above the 
quantity demanded will result in an outflow of reserves. Similarly; an 
increase in the demand for money will result in a reserve inflow. 
It is also clear from this formulation that the kingdom will tend to 
gain international reserves as its real income and domestic price level rise 
(nominal income). Similarly, it will lose international reserves if SAMA 
attempts to expand the money supply by increasing domestic assets (or 
as the interest rate rises). 
These conclusions logically follow from the assumed impact of 
increases in interest rates and prices on the demand for or supply of 
money; i.e., increases in real income induce a rise in the demand for 
money, while an increase in the interest rate reduces that demand. Further-
more, an increase in the domestic price level reduces the real money 
supply and induces an inflow of reserves. 
While this conclusion may seem at odds with standard Keynesian 
theory, the effects of both the interest rate and price level follow from 
the assumption that, in monetary equilibrium, domestic inflation and 
interest rates are closely linked to and primarily determined by changes in 
the respective world rates. Consequently, reserve flows induced by price 
or interest rate differentials between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the 
• 
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world in the short run Keynesian world, are absent in this longer run 
equilibrium approach (7). 
Absence of price or interest rate differentials is also assured by 
the assumption of close substitutability among the goods and services of 
Saudi Arabia and its trading partners. In the limiting case of perfect 
substitutability (in the long run), interest rates and price levels would be 
fully equalized between Saudi Arabia and her trading partners. 
The results (equation 1- 3) imply that: 
1. For all practical purposes, the supply of money under SAMA's 
control rather than the domestic quantity of money is ultimately deter-
mined by the flow. of foreign reserves in conjunction with government 
budgetary decisions. 
2. That foreign reserve flows can and do operate to restore equilibrium 
in the money ,market i.e., that the massive reserve inflows in recent years 
have been necessary to satisfy the increased domestic demand for money 
arising from the oil price induced increases in real income. 
3. That any balance of payments disequilibria experienced by Saudi 
Arabia must inevitably be transitory; i.e., the country's authorities may be 
able if they wish to «sterilize» acquisitions of international reserves, but 
they would eventually exhaust their stocks of domestic assets, including 
possibly the ability to force domestic commercial banks to hold interna-
tional assets instead of domestic assets. 
4. The authorities would in this case be able to continue to sterilize 
reserve inflows only by lending the money back to foreign countries 
on non-commercial terms. 
5. As long as real income continues to rise at rates which are rapid 
relative to those for the rest of the world, the demand for money in the 
kingdom will continue to rise relative to the demand for money in other 
countries. Assuming the government does not move dramatically towards 
budgetary deficits, this increased demand for money must necessarily come 
from additional reserve inflows. 
Weighted Change in Foreign Assets 
( 1) SPA (SPA/MB) = -0.77ius + 3.94NOXN - 0.81Dc(DC/MB) -
- 300.81 lillFGDP 
(2.07) 
(7) Ibid., p. 270. 
( 6.49) (3.78) ( 15.36) 
26.03 
( 1.03) r2 = 0.9969; F = 83.49 
• 
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Change in Foreign Assets 
(Current Prices) 
(2) ASFA = -1.00DC + 3.98ANOXN + 8.39ADFGDP -
(31.72) (5.11) (4.03) 
- 1.12PC - 1.98 
1109 
(-2.60)' (3.74) r2 = 0.9988; F = 1927.20 
(Constant Prices) 
(3) ASFAP = -0.99ADCP + 0.69NOXNP - 0.03 
. ( - 91.60) ( 5 .16) ( - 0 .17 ) 
r2 = 0.9988; F = 4210.03 
Credit 
The money supply is traditionally regarded as one of the main 
explanatory variables for private sector credit. This link is the basis for 
much monetary policy. Yet much discussion has centered around the fact 
that monetary policy acts with a lag. When decisions are taken to affect 
the money supply, there is usually a year's lag until the new credit 
conditions begin to affect the real sectors of the economy. As noted 
above, a strong link seems to exist from oil revenues to net foreign assets 
to government expenditure to the money base to the money supply. 
Several functional forms expressing the link between lagged government 
revenues (GORFSPL), exports (FEXPTNAR) and real domestic credit 
(DCP) were tested (equations 4-13) and confirmed this mechanism. 
Changes in domestic credit ADCP were related to real non-oil income 
(NOXNP) and changes in foreign assets (ASF AP). Private credit (PCP) 
in turn was largely related to domestic credit and non-oil income. 
Domestic Credit 
(Constant Prices) 
(4) DCP = l.39DCPL + 0.28GORFSPL 
- 3.47 
( -1.18) 
( 5) DCP 
(4.66) (1.79) 
- -1.45FEXPTNAR 
( - 2.34) 
r2 = 0.8313; F = 32.03 
0 .87 G<!JRFSPL + 11.89 
( -2.96) ( 1.98) 
r2 = 0.8531; F = 37.75 
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(6) aDCP = 0.09NOXNP - 0.97MFAP 0.44 
(5.21) (-137.80) (-1.97) 
r2 = 0.9993; F = 9573.51 
(Current Prices) 
(7) DC = -0.96GENAN - 0.92FEXPTNA + 10.23 
(-3.55) (-8.71) (3.39) . 
r2 = 0.9826; F = 337 .87 
(8) t:..DC = -0.96FEXPTNA + 5.43.t:..NOXN + 4.72 
(-3.82) (3.18) (0.92) 
r2 = 0.5552; F = 8.84 
( 9) t:..DC = 0.78 GENAN 0.97 FEXPTNA + 10.23 
(-3.55) (-8.71) (3.39) 
Private Credit 
(Constant Prices) 
r2 = 0.9826; F = 337.87 
( 10) PCP = -0.02DCP + 0.08NOXNP + 0.80 
( - 3.95) (3.16) ( 4.38) 
r2 = 0.9171; F = 71.93 
(Current Prices) 
(11) PC= -0.04DC + 0.05NOXN + 0.94 
( -7.44) (3.03) (7.12) 
r2 = 0.9907; F = 637.42 
( 12) PC = 0.23NOXN - 3.66DFGDP - 0.04DC + 3.32 
(2.52) (-1.35) ( -2.98) (1.68) 
r2 = 0.9896; F = 381.68 
( 13) aPC = -0.06a.5GD + 0.09a5FA - 0.03NOXNL + 0.26 
(-8.58) (14.21) (-5.02) (4.03) 
r2 = 0.9783; F = 165.62 
Inflation 
A number of variables and relationships have been hypothesized 
possibly contributing to the country's recent inflationary episode. The 
following empirical analysis includes a discussion of the evidence on ( 1) 
the influence of foreign trade or openness variables on inflation, (2) the 
impact of excess demand on inflation, (3) the contribution of fiscal 
development variables to inflation, ( 4) the monetarist explanation of in-
flation, and ( 5) the process of reserve sterilization. 
INFLATION AND OIL BASED DEVELOPMENT 1111 
Openness and Inflation 
Recent empirical work (8) indicates that there is a relationship 
between the degree of national integration into the world economic 
system and inflation; i.e., in general the more open countries have 
experienced less price inflation. Presumably openness serves as a kind 
of safety valve; domestic inflationary pressure spills over into the balance 
of payments in the open economy thus necessitating less price inflation. 
One way of testing for the effect of openness on domestic inflation 
is to test various formulations of a price equation with measures reflecting 
the degree of contact with the world economy included as one of the 
dependent variables. For example, several variables that might be included 
are: (1) the import: income ratio (ZAB), (2) the rate of change of the 
import: income ratio (RZAB); .(3) the terms of trade (ratio of import 
prices to export prices, ZJTT); (4) the rate of growth of the money 
supply (GMl), and (5) the rate of growth of real income (GNOXR) and 
expected inflation (FAXL) (9 ). 
One would expect the import income ratio to be negatively related 
to the rate of inflation, large increases in the money supply should be 
inflationary especially during periods when the economy is operating at 
or near full employment. Similarly, a rapid rate of growth of income may 
cause inflation because of the creation of bottlenecks or a general difficulty 
to shift resources around at short notice. 
Since a rise in the price of imports (and indirectly perhaps exports) 
will tend to induce a rise in the general price level, the terms of trade 
should be positively related to the rate of inflation. Finally, it may be 
assumed that the change in openness will be negatively related to the 
rate of price increase (1°). 
The rate of inflation (the rate of change in the non-oil GDP deflator) 
was regressed on the above dependent variables for the period 1961-1978. 
The final result (equation 12) goes somewhat against our initial hypothesis. 
(B) Sec M. A. IYOHA, «Inflation and Openness in Less Developed Economies: A 
Cross Country Analysis», Economic Development and Cultural Change (October 1973), 
pp. 31-38, and M. A. AKHTAR, «An Empirical Note on Inflation and Openness in Less 
Devdopcd Economies», The Philippine Economic Journal (1976), pp. 636-649. 
(9) FAXL is the expected rate of inflation defined here as the inflation rate in the 
previous year minus the inflation rate in the year prior to that. See A. HAlUIEll, cc The 
Dynamics of Inflation in Chile», in C. CHRIST, ed., Measurement in Economics (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 219-250. 
(10) AKHTAR, op. cit., p. 637. 
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The sign of ZAB is positive reflecting perhaps the fact that as Saudi Arabia 
increased imports after 1973 to offset domestic shortages, world prices were 
simultaneously increasing. Clearly, the OPEC price increases and world 
inflation are closely related. The monetary growth (either Ml or M2) was 
not significant interestingly enough; therefore, four largely exogenous non-
monetary variables-ZAB, GWP, GNOXR, and FAXL account for nearly 
99 percent of the fluctuations in the rate of Saudi Arabian domestic inflation. 
Deviations from the Trend as a Measure of Excess Demand 
It is often argued that at least three characteristics of countries at 
Saudi Arabia's level of development limit the effectiveness of deviations 
from the trend (DTNOXR) as a measure of excess demand (11), namely 
the high share of agricultural products in both production and consumption, 
the high rates of inflation and the uneven growth of productive capacity. 
Saudi Arabia while still considered a developing country is abnormal in 
not having any of these particular features. The agriculture sector is 
quite small; until the 1970s there was only negligible inflation and because 
of oil revenues and the resulting relative lack of an effective foreign 
exchange constraint productive capacity has proceeded at a somewhat 
even pace. 
A second limitatfon of the usefulness of DTNOXR often cited (12 ) 
as a measure of excess demand is that it incorporates the assumption that 
productive capacity grows at a constant rate. 
While this will not necessarily be true in developed countries, it is 
often far less likely to be the case in developing countries, given their 
dependence on unstable export earnings for the purchase of imported 
capital goods. Saudi Arabia, however, does not suffer from limitations on 
imports. In addition its rate of capital formation has tended to be 
constrained simply by a rather constant level of absorptive capacity 
rather than a fluctuating rate of foreign exchange earnings. 
Implicit in the use of DTNOXR is the notion that when the growth 
of output rises above its long run trend, domestic productive capacity 
is being strained and prices therefore must rise in order for output to 
(11) An excellent survey of these issues is given in Edmund SHEEHEY, «On the Measu-
rement of Imported Inflation in Developing Countries», Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv {1979), 
pp. 68-78. 
(12) Ibid. 
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expand. Admittedly this assumption is best suited to an advanced economy 
in which the production and consumption of goods consist largely of 
industrial products for which supply is flexible enough to respond to 
short run shifts in demand. Because in most developing countries produc-
tion and consumption are concentrated heavily on agricultural products 
(which in the short run are more subject to fluctuations in domestic 
supply than in domestic demand), it is questionable whether the DTNOXR 
formulation of inflationary pressures would be satisfactory. Again in 
Saudi Arabia's case the relatively small agricultural sector means that the 
country should not experience such a high degree of short rigidity and 
therefore the DTNOXR approach might be somewhat more applicable. 
A third reason (13 ) commonly used for doubting the applicability of 
DTNOXR as an accurate measure of demand pressure in developing 
countries is their generally higher rates of inflation and money supply 
growth. Within a limited range changes in short run demand pressure 
will tend to result partially in higher non-agricultural output and partially 
in price increases. Presumably, there is a point beyond which an increase 
in demand will result in higher prices only. Again, it is often argued that 
this point is probably surpassed more often in a developing country 
because of its higher rate of money supply increase (and the likelihood 
that, with the greater share of agricultural production in GDP, its short 
run elasticity of supply is lower). 
Again an examination of Saudi Arabia's monetary expansion indicates 
that the kingdom experienced increases in liquidity more or less in line 
with the more advanced countries. 
If we accept the fact that most of the arguments against using 
DTNOXR as a measure of excess demand are not applicable for Saudi 
Arabia, the question remains as to the best structural form for testing 
the impact of this variable on domestic prices. Several formulations were 
tried with the final (equations 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11) yielding significant 
and positive results. 
The results confirm that abnormtilly high rates of growth in the 
kingdom have been associated with periods of price increase. Of interest 
is the fact that changes in the GDP deflator (ADFGDP) are much more 
sensitive to DTNOXR than changes in oil prices (equation 10). DTNOXR 
by itself only accounts for about 60 ·percent of the changes in the 
GDP deflator. 
• 
( 13) Ibid. 
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Excess Demand and Domestic Inflation 
The tests for openness and deviations from the trend suggests that 
a useful framework for the analysis of inflation in Saudi Arabia would be 
to directly examine the link between real expenditures and domestic price 
change. Real demand in Saudi Arabia is determined in part by factors 
that depend on aggregate supply and in part by factors that are deter~ined 
independently of supply. This approach assumes that it is in fact the 
factors that bring demand and supply into balance that are ultimately 
responsible for the economy's domestic price changes. For purposes of 
analysis, real demand is defined in terms of expenditures in constant prices 
and includes: planned expenditures, private expenditures, foreign expendi-
tures for exports, and imports. 
Planned expenditures are defined here (1') as consisting of government 
consumption and gross domestic investment. Part of gross domestic 
investment such as social services and education grows more or less in 
line with GDP in Saudi Arabia. But the other component of investment 
is defense. Obviously defense expenditures cannot be regarded as determined 
by economic factors, although they are conditioned somewhat by economic 
capacity. 
With these considerations in mind several variables were created 
and used in the regression equations for domestic price changes. They 
included (15) (in constant prices): 
FSMIAS = incremental aggregate supply 





= incremental domestic absorption 
= incremental planned impact 
Also included were: 
FWPIND = world inflation 
ADNP real domestic supply 
DTNOXR = deviation of real non-oil GDP from its trend 
DANP domestic absorption. 
(14) Following Arthur SMITHIES, The Economic Potential of the Arab Countries 
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1978), p. 21. • 
( 16) See SMITHIES, op. cit., for a detailed definition of the items comprising each variable. 
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In equation 7, Table 1, FSMIPI and FSMIDA were found to be 
statistically significant and account for nearly 80 percent of the observed 
change in the non-oil GDP deflater. 
An approximation to this approach looks at the excess liquidity 
created in the process of demand expansion (Table 2). 
(EXCESS= Ml/NOXNP). 
In contrast to the assumptions above, one using the monetary approach 
to study inflation in Saudi Arabia would undoubtedly begin with the fun-
damental proposition that the kingdom's inflation is merely an interaction 
of market supply and demand for money (and non-financial objects). Put 
differently, price movements are viewed by this model as systematically 
dependent upon current and immediate past evolutions of the interaction 
between supply and demand conditions. 
The starting point of this analysis is the basic monetarist model (16 ) 
derived from the equation of exchange. More specifically, it assumes a 
simple money demand function of the following form: 
(h) M/PY =re• 
where M is the (exogenously determined) nominal stock of money; P is 
the price, and Y is a measure of real income, and C is the expected cost 
of holding real balances. Equation (h) is solved for P and expressed in 
terms of growth rates or (depicted by G prefixing the variable): 
(i) INF= RMl - (1-a) GY-bGC. 
Equation (i) incorporates the basic elements of the monetarist approach 
to inflation: money, real income, and the expected cost of holding real 
balances. In addition this formulation captures the basic methodological 
bias of the monetarist school; i.e., the equation has a limited number 
of variables, and the nature of relationships is clear and straightforward. 
The growth of money relative to output and cost of holding real balances 
will generate an increase in the rate of inflation. The growth of real income 
will cause decreases in the rate of inflation (via absorbing money in the 
increased demand for real balances). Similarly, the rate of inflation is 
assumed to be inversely related to the expected cost of holding real balances. 
Equation (i) assumes instantaneous adjustment of monetary changes 
and no money illusion. Therefore, the tested form of the monetarist 
equation is: 
(j) INF= a+ a1CM1 + a2GM1L - GYNOXR + FAXL 




SAUDI ARABIA: INFLATIONARY MECHANISMS 
(Two Stage least square estimates) 
Estimat<d Equation 
The GDP Deflater (DFGDP) 
1. DFGDP = 3.45 WPIND - 0.03 ADNP - 1.64 (14.31) ( -6.72) (-9.02) 
2. DFGDP = 0.11 EXCESS + .1.55 (1551) (22.14) 
3. DFGDP = -0.02 ADNP + 0.14 DANP - 0.09 ( -3.14) ( 11.26) (0.06) 
4. DFGDP = 0.94 DFGDPL + 0.63 WPIND - 0.52 (10.31) (4.17) ( -4.58) 
5. DFGDP = 24.43 DTNOXR - 0.96 (12.25) ( 10.41) 
6. DFGDP = 5.19 DTNOXR + 0.71 DFGDPL + 0.61 WPIND ( 1.93) (4.86) . (4.38) 
Cbangc in GDP Deflater ( DDFGDP l 
7. DDFGDP = -0.09 FSMIAS + 0.21 FSMIDA + 0.15 FSMIPI + O.Ql 
(-2.35) ( 3.76) (2.02) 
8. DDFGDP = 1.01 WPINDL - 0.19 DFGDPL - 0.73 
(7.62) ( -2.87) ( -8.02) 
9. DDFGDP = C.61 WPIND - 15.7 DWPIND + 1.98 DTNOXR 
(454) (-3.95) ( 1.94) 
10. DFGDP = 5.21 DTNOXR + 0.42 DWPIND (4.00) (0.80) 
11. DDFGDP = 5.65 DTNOXR - 0.07 
(4.83) ( 1.20) 
Inflation (INF) 
12. INF = 40.29 ZAB + 053 GWP + 1.55 GNOXR + 0.98 FAXL - 27.75 (2.81) (2.23) (6.00) (7.371 (4.93) 
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TABLE 2. 
>
SAUDI ARABIA: INFLATIONARY PRESSURES 
(Two Stage least square estimates) 
Variable Estimated Equation r2 F 
.... 
z 
0.71DZNANP - 1.40DPINNOP + 129DEXPTNAR + 0.05DMSFAR + 0.36 
lrj 
FSMIAS = 0.9602 66.33 t"" (10.75) ( -2.98) ( 11.36) (3.63) (1.69) > ~ 
.... 
FSMDA = 6.57 GINP. + 1.50 PINP + 1.32 GCNP - 0.11 0.9949 774.92 0 ( 3.53) (3.03) (7.03) (-0.33) z 
> 
FSMPI 0.94 GINP + 0.73 PINP - 0.11 ZNANP + 1.39 GCNP - 0.13 0.9906 271.93 z = ti (4.67) (2.33) ( -13.26) (13.09) (0.99) 0 
.... 
FSMIDA = 0.76 DGENANP + 0.98 DPCNP + 1.60 PINP + 0.18 0.8873 34.13 t"" (7.99) (4.36) (0.78) c:I 
> 
FSMIPI = -0.03 DMSFAP + 0.05 GORFSPL + 0.04 0.7103 15.92 rn t!I (2.15) (4.89) (0.02) ti 
EXCESS 10.30 MBP + 1.27 BAP - 5.74 NOXNP + 11.55 0.9207 46.44 ti = t!I (3.39) (2.97) ( -3.09) ( 1.64) < 
t!I 
EXCESSC = 0.04 Ml + 0.05 NOXNP + 0.00 0.9896 666.20 t"" 0 ( 8.53) (3.86) (0.00) "d 
a;:: 
ADNP = 6.82 ZNANPL + 27.97 MlPL - 12.58 0.9450 111.59 ~ (-8.73) ( 11.53) (3.44) >i 
DANP = 0.82 GENANP + 1.50 PENANP - 1.43 0.9956 1470.47 (6.92) (7.74) ( -:-1.92) 
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where GYNOXR is the gr.owth of real non-oil income; GMlL is the 
lagged growth of the money supply, and F AXL is the inflation rate lagged 
one year minus the inflation rate lagged two years. 
The basic monetarist contention is: (1) that the causal relation runs 
from money to prices and output; (2) any persistent increase in money 
relative to output is a sufficient condition for inflation; (3) the magnitude 
and length of inflation is dependent on the magnitude and p~rsistence of 
monetary growth; (4) the occurrence of inflation is independent of the 
level of employment in the economy, and (5) it is the increasing growth 
rate of money which yields inflationary pressures. 
The major assumptions of the monetarist model are valid for deve-
loping economies such as Saudi Arabia in the sense that the structural 
conditions, institutions and usual governmental actions vis a vis the economy 
are not in any way incompatible with the model. For example, in such 
economies expansionary monetary policies are of ten pursued in order 
to utilize idle resources often resulting in monetization of the rural economy. 
The monetary explanation appears to perform very poorly over this 
period. By itself the rate of growth of money (RMl) only explained 47 .30 
percent of the observed rate of inflation. Also when combined with other 
variables, RMl often has a negative sign. In fact better results were 
obtained by simply regressing the rate of world inflation on domestic 
inflation. By itself world inflation accounts for about 75 percent of the 
fluctuations in domestic inflation. Lagged world inflation, however, does 
not significantly contribute to the regression equation when introduced with 
current world inflation. This variable (GWPL) does, however, become 
significant when regressed with the growth of money. 
Of the other variables examined in this context, expected inflation 
(defined here as the difference between last year's inflation and the rate 
of inflation in the prior year) was highly significant and positive when 
regressed on current period inflation. This indicates that the cost of 
holding money is an important element influencing behavior in Saudi 
Arabia: 
The inadequacy of the monetarist model in explaining the rate of 
inflation in Saudi Arabia raises the question as to whether or not the 
money supply is an exogenous variable in the kingdom. If the money supply 
increases in response to other forces such as industrialization, some inflation 
will be an inevitable result of the structural factors underlying changes. 
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Conclusions 
Standard analysis of the balance of payments in OPEC countries 
is usually based on real variables (oil sales ·and prices on the one hand, 
import demands on the other) and focuses on the current account in the 
balance of payments. The approach developed here considers those factors 
which affect monetary equilibrium-income prices, interest rates, and 
domestic assets - and does not focus exclusively on any one component 
in the balance of payments account. 
The desirability of considering more than just the current account 
arises from the increasing importance of the capital account activities of 
the country. Because of the international investment activity of the Saudi 
Arabian government, the country's balance of payments accounts may no 
longer be analyzed in terms of current account balances alone. The broader 
view of our approach offers a framework for analyzing the balance on the 
entire account, an approach which focuses on long run changes, and a 
model which appears to be consistent with recent events affecting the 
country. 
Finally, the lack of a significant relationship between the growth of 
money and inflation raises some questions as to Saudi policy concern over 
the control of domestic liquidity. Two questions arise: ( 1) can the autho-
rities control the money supply, and (2) should they pursue tight monetary 
control at the risk of slowing down growth? 
INFLAZIONE E SVILUPPO BASATO SUL PETROLIO: FALLIMEN-
TO DEL MODELLO MONETARISTA NELL'ARABIA SAUDITA 
La natura del processo inflazionistico nell'Arabia Saudita deve essere iden-
tificata e quanti£cata prima di poter prendere intelligenti decisioni fondamen-
tali di lungo periodo come il tasso di produzione petrolifera, il livello deUa 
spesa interna governativa e il valore del cambio riyal/dollaro. Allo scopo di 
identificare il tipo e le origini dell'inflazione che si e verificata nel regno 
soprattutto dopo il 1972 l'articolo si pone tre questioni fondamentali: 1) in 
che misura l'inflazione recente e stata importata anziche generata all'interno; 
2) quale ruolo esattamente hanno avuto le spese governative nel creare e soste-
nere le pressioni inflazionistiche, e 3} se il meccanismo monetario esistente nel 
paese sia stato fondamentalmente diverso da quello esistente nella maggior 
parte di altri paesi in via di sviluppo e, in caso positivo, in che modo e con 
quali implicazioni per la politica di stabilizzazione. 
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Per analizzare le origini della pressione inflazionistica, sono stati esaminati 
statisticamente parecchi modelli. Questi includono un modello monetarista 
fondamentale, un modello keynesiano e diverse. versioni eclettiche. I risultati 
per il periodo 1960-1980 indicano che la spiegazione monetaria dell 'inflazione 
appare adeguarsi molto poco al paese. Il tasso di crescita della moneta spiega 
soltanto il 47 ,30% del tasso d'inflazione osservato. In effetti risultati migliori 
sono stati ottenuti con una regressione semplice fra il tasso dell'inflazione 
mondiale e quello dell'inflazione nazionale. Considerata da sola l'inflazione 
mondiale spiega circa il 75% delle fluttuazioni dell'inflazione interna. Per 
quanto riguarda le altre variabili esaminate in questo articolo, l'inflazione 
prevista (definita come la differenza fra l'inflazione dell'ultimo anno e il tasso 
d'inflazione dell'anno precedente) e altamente significativa e positiva quando 
regressa sull'inflazione del periodo corrente. Questo risultato indica che iJ 
costo di detenere moneta e un elemento importante che influenza il comporta-
mento dell'Arabia Saudita. 
L'inadeguatezza del modello monetarista nella spiegazione del tasso d'in-
flazione in Arabia Saudita pone il problema se l'offerta di moneta del paese 
sia una variabile esogena o no. Se l'offerta di moneta aumenta in risposta ad 
altre forze come' l'industrializzazione, un poco di inflazione sara un risultato 
inevitabile dei fattori strutturali che determinano i cambiamenti. 
